\aWeak States at Global Climate Negotiations / \cFederica Genovese
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\a1st ed.
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\aCambridge : \bCambridge University Press, \c2020
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\a74 pages : \billustrations, map ; \c23 cm.
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\aCambridge elements.
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\aElements in international relations.
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\aIncludes bibliographical references.
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\a1. Introduction -- 2. When Do Weak States Win Global Climate Politics Battles and Why? -- 3. Measuring Preferences and Success at Global Climate Change Conferences -- 4. Empirical Evidence from Climate Negotiations -- 5. Conclusion
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\aThis Element provides an explanation for the power of weak states in international politics, focusing on the case of international climate negotiations at the United Nations. The author points to the pitfalls of assuming that weak countries elicit power from their coordinated salience for climate issues. Contrastingly, it is argued that weak states' influence at global climate negotiations depends on the moral authority provided by strong states. The author maintains that weak states' authority is contingent on international vulnerability, which intersects broader domestic discussions of global justice, and pushes the leaders of strong countries to concede power to weak countries. New empirical evidence is shown in support of the theory.
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