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การประชุมวิชาการ
สถาบันพระปกเกล้า ครั้งที่ 21
ลดช่องว่างความเหลื่อมล้ำ สร้างคุณภาพประชาธิปไตย

As the small R-squared values indicate, the political economy theories
based on distributional conflicts of material interests seemed limited in

accounting for the individual-level variation in support for democracy or
opposition to dictatorship. First, Table 2 shows evidence from unequal countries

with the Gini coefficient of 35.0 or above. Falling in the richest quintile instead
of the poorest one had positive effects on democracy in general and checks
and balances. Similarly, falling in the richest quintile instead of the poorest one

had negative effects on dictatorship. It is notable that although the difference
was not significant, the wealthy appeared to be less supportive of inclusive

citizenship than the poor. Of socio-demographic characteristics, age had positive
effects on democracy in general and checks and balances while it had negative
effects on dictatorship. Education had positive effects on inclusive citizenship

and checks and balances, not on democracy in general, while it had negative
effects on dictatorship. The results evidently show that in countries with high

income inequality the wealthy proved to be more (not less) supportive of
democracy as well as more (not less) opposed to dictatorship than the poor.
The finding seems less consistent with the individual-level implications of the

redistribution-democracy theory or the self-enforcing theory of democracy. That
the wealthy were more supportive of checks and balances, a core principle of

liberal democracy, appears to be more consistent with the expectation of the
elite-competition theory.

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